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Abstract
A most wellknown determinacy condition on interest rate rules is
the “Taylor principle”, which says that nominal interest rates should
respond more than hundred percent to inflation. Unfortunately, no-
tably because interest rates must be positive, the Taylor principle
cannot be satisfied for all interest rates, and as a consequence global
determinacy may not prevail even though there exists a locally deter-
minate equilibrium.
We propose here a simple alternative to the Taylor principle, which
takes the form of a new condition on interest rate rules that ensures
global determinacy. An important feature of the policy package is that
it does not rely at all on any of the fiscal policies associated with the
“fiscal theory of the price level”, which was so far the main alternative
for determinacy.
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1 Introduction
In the recent years an important concern of macroeconomists has been to find
out which combinations of monetary and fiscal policies lead to determinacy
of the dynamic equilibrium. Notably the early seminal work of Leeper (1991)
shows how either monetary or fiscal policies can lead to local determinacy.
On the monetary side the focus has been recently on interest rate rules.
A central result is the wellknown “Taylor principle”, which says that the
nominal interest rate should respond to inflation with an elasticity greater
than one1 (Taylor, 1993, 1998).
Unfortunately, as is wellknown, the Taylor principle is a condition for
local, not global determinacy. Notably if one takes into account the fact that
nominal interest rates must be positive, then the Taylor principle cannot
be satisfied for all values of the interest rates, and as a consequence global
determinacy may not prevail even though there exists a locally determinate
equilibrium (Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2001).
If the Taylor principle cannot deliver global determinacy, there is another
wellknown determinacy condition (Sims, 1994, Woodford, 1994, 1995), which
has been known under the name of “fiscal theory of the price level” (FTPL).
The basic idea behind the FTPL is that the government pursues fiscal policies
such that, in oﬀ-equilibrium paths, it will not satisfy its intertemporal budget
constraint, and run an explosive debt policy. This leaves only one feasible
equilibrium path2. Now although such oﬀ-equilibrium paths are not observed
in the model’s equilibrium, it would be extremely optimistic to assume that in
real life situations the economy would follow at every instant the equilibrium
path while the government pursues such policies. As a result many people
would be reluctant to advise such policies to a real life government.
In view of the above qualifications the purpose of this article is to propose
a simple condition on interest rate rules that will ensure global determinacy,
even when no FTPL-type policies are implemented.
A key to the results is that we will make the realistic assumption that the
economies we work in are non-Ricardian. By non-Ricardian economies we
mean economies where, as in OLG models, new agents enter in time, so that
in particular Ricardian equivalence fails (Barro, 1974). We shall see that in
such a framework global determinacy can be obtained under reasonable fiscal
and monetary policies.
1The original Taylor rule (1993) had actually both inflation and output as arguments,
but the debate has mostly centered around inflation.
2Appraisals (with diﬀerent degrees of criticism) of the FTPL appear in Buiter (2002),
Christiano and Fitzgerald (2000), Cochrane (2005), Kocherlakota and Phelan (1999), Mc-
Callum (2001), Niepelt (2004) and Weil (2002).
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2 The model
Wewant to have a non Ricardian monetary model that “nests” the traditional
infinitely lived agent model, so we shall use a monetary model due to Weil
(1987, 1991), and assume that new “generations” of households are born each
period, but nobody dies. Denote as Nt the number of households alive at
time t. So Nt − Nt−1 ≥ 0 households are born in period t. We will mainly
work below with a constant rate of growth of the population n ≥ 0, so that
Nt = (1 + n)t. The Ricardian case is obtained by taking the limit case n = 0.
Consider a household born in period j. We denote by cjt, yjt and mjt its
consumption, endowment and money holdings at time t ≥ j. This household
maximizes the following utility function:
Ujt =
∞X
s=t
βs−tLog cjs (1)
and is submitted in period t to a “cash in advance” constraint:
Ptcjt ≤ mjt (2)
Household j begins period t with a financial wealth ωjt. First the bond
market opens, and the household lends an amount bjt at the nominal interest
rate it. The rest is kept under the form of money mjt, so that:
ωjt = mjt + bjt (3)
Then the goods market opens, and the household sells his endowment yjt,
pays taxes τ jt in real terms and consumes cjt, subject to the cash constraint
(2). Consequently, the budget constraint for household j is:
ωjt+1 = (1 + it)ωjt − itmjt + Ptyjt − Ptτ jt − Ptcjt (4)
Aggregate quantities are obtained by summing the various individual vari-
ables. There are Nj −Nj−1 agents in generation j, so for example aggregate
assets Ωt and taxes Tt are equal to:
Ωt =
X
j≤t
(Nj −Nj−1)ωjt Tt =
X
j≤t
(Nj −Nj−1) τ jt (5)
Similar formulas apply to output Yt, consumption Ct, money Mt and
bonds Bt. We now must describe how endowments and taxes are distributed
among households. We assume that all households have the same income
and taxes, so that:
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yjt = yt = Yt/Nt τ jt = τ t = Tt/Nt (6)
and that real income per head grows at the rate ζ:
yt+1/yt = ζ Yt+1/Yt = (1 + n) ζ (7)
Let us now consider government. Households’ aggregate financial wealth
Ωt has as a counterpart an identical amount Ωt of financial liabilities of the
government. These are decomposed into money and bonds:
Ωt =Mt +Bt (8)
The evolution of these liabilities is described by the government’s budget
constraint:
Ωt+1 = (1 + it)Ωt − itMt − PtTt (9)
Note that, to simplify the exposition and to concentrate on tax policy,
we assume that governement spending is zero. If not, the results would be
essentially the same, but the formulas would be more clumsy.
2.1 Monetary policy
We shall consider “Taylor rules” where the nominal interest rate responds to
inflation:
1 + it = Φ (Πt) Φ (Πt) ≥ 1 (10)
with Πt = Pt/Pt−1. We shall also define the elasticity of this function:
φ (Πt) =
∂LogΦ (Πt)
∂LogΠt
=
ΠtΦ0 (Πt)
Φ (Πt)
(11)
One says that the Taylor principle is satisfied at Πt if φ (Πt) > 1.
2.2 Fiscal policy
If the budget was balanced, taxes would be equal to interest payments on
bonds itBt, so that one would have:
PtTt = itBt (12)
We shall actually assume that the government can run a deficit or a
surplus, so taxes have the form:
4
PtTt = itBt −D (Ωt, PtYt) (13)
where the function D (Ωt, PtYt), which represents the fiscal deficit in nominal
terms, is homogeneous of degree 1 in its two arguments. The argument PtYt
represents some type of income tax, while the argument Ωt reflects the fact
that the government may want to raise taxes in order to diminish its financial
liabilities Ωt.
Putting together equations (8), (9) and (13), we find:
Ωt+1 = Ωt +D (Ωt, PtYt) (14)
3 Dynamics
Equation (14) is our first dynamic equation. Turning now to nominal income
PtYt, it is shown in the appendix that, assuming Nt+1/Nt = 1 + n, the
dynamics of nominal income PtYt is given by:
Pt+1Yt+1 = β (1 + n) (1 + it)PtYt − (1− β)nΩt+1 (15)
Combining with equation (10) we obtain:
Pt+1Yt+1 = β (1 + n)Φ (Πt)PtYt − (1− β)nΩt+1 (16)
We shall actually not use the two dynamic equations (14) and (16) as
such, but rather use as working variables inflation Πt and the predetermined
variable Xt defined as3:
Xt =
Ωt
Pt−1Yt−1
(17)
Then dividing both sides of equation (16) by ζ (1 + n)PtYt it becomes:
Πt+1 =
Φ (Πt)
ξ
− νXt+1 (18)
where ξ = ζ/β is the autarkic interest rate4 and:
ν =
(1− β)n
(1 + n) ζ
(19)
3This representation is borrowed from Guillard (2004).
4The autarkic interest rate is the one which would prevail if each generation lived in
complete autarky. Alternatively it is the real interest rate that would prevail in an economy
with a single dynasty, and the utility function (1).
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Let us now consider equation (14) and divide both sides by PtYt. We find,
in view of the homogeneity properties of the function D:
Xt+1 =
Ωt +D (Ωt, PtYt)
PtYt
=
Ωt
PtYt
+D
µ
Ωt
PtYt
, 1
¶
(20)
Let us define the “fiscal function” F :
F (Zt) = Zt +D (Zt, 1) (21)
Then equation (20) becomes, taking Zt = Ωt/PtYt:
Xt+1 = F (Zt) = F
µ
Ωt
PtYt
¶
(22)
Now we have:
Zt =
Ωt
PtYt
=
Ωt
Pt−1Yt−1
Pt−1Yt−1
PtYt
=
Xt
ζ (1 + n)Πt
(23)
so that finally:
Xt+1 = F (Zt) = F
·
Xt
ζ (1 + n)Πt
¸
(24)
The fiscal function F will play an important role in what follows. We
shall assume F 0 (Zt) > 0 and denote as f (Zt) its elasticity:
f = f (Zt) =
∂Log [F (Zt)]
∂LogZt
(25)
4 Ricardian economies and local determinacy
We begin our investigation with the traditional Ricardian version of the
model. For that it is enough to take n = 0. The dynamic system (18),
(24) simplifies as:
Πt+1 =
Φ (Πt)
ξ
(26)
Xt+1 = F
µ
Xt
ζΠt
¶
(27)
Steady states (Π,X) of this system (when they exist) are characterized
by:
6
Π = Φ (Π)
ξ
(28)
X = F
µ
X
ζΠ
¶
(29)
Linearizing (26), (27) around a steady state (Π, X) we find:
Πt+1 −Π = φ (Πt −Π) (30)
Xt+1 −X = f (Xt −X)−
Xf
Π (Πt −Π) (31)
or in matrix form:·
Πt+1 −Π
Xt+1 −X
¸
=
·
φ 0
−Xf/Π f
¸ ·
Πt −Π
Xt −X
¸
(32)
with:
φ = φ (Π) = ΠΦ
0 (Π)
Φ (Π) f = f (Z) =
ZF 0 (Z)
F (Z)
(33)
The two roots are thus φ and f . Since there is one predetermined variable,
Xt, and one non predetermined, Πt, there will be local determinacy if one of
the roots has modulus smaller than 1, the other bigger.
So we have two possibilities for local determinacy5. The first is:
φ > 1 f < 1 (34)
We recognize with φ > 1 the Taylor principle. But we see that with the
tax function appears a new possibility for local determinacy, i.e.:
φ < 1 f > 1 (35)
The condition φ < 1 says that the Taylor principle is not satisfied. But
f > 1 means that the ratio of government’s financial liabilities to nominal
income will have divergent dynamics along oﬀ-equilibrium paths (equation
31). As we indicated above, we want to avoid such policies, whose potentially
destabilizing eﬀects in real life situations certainly contributed making the
FTPL controversial6.
5This duality was uncovered in Leeper (1991).
6Note that the condition f > 1 should not be identified with the FTPL, since the
FTPL is usually based on a global determinacy argument, whereas we give here a local
determinacy condition. But the condition f > 1 is anyway a necessary one, and captures
in a simple and elegant manner the controversial feature of the FTPL.
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5 Global determinacy in the non-Ricardian
case
We just saw that in the Ricardian framework there are two alternative con-
ditions for local determinacy, corresponding to the Taylor principle and the
FTPL, and expressed respectively as φ (Πt) > 1 and f (Zt) > 1.
What we want to show is that in a non-Ricardian world it is possible to
find some interest rate rules Φ (Πt) such that (a) global determinacy obtains,
and (b) no FTPL-type fiscal policy is used:
f (Zt) ≤ 1 (36)
That such a combination is indeed possible is demonstrated in the follow-
ing proposition:
Proposition 1: Let us assume:
Φ0 (Πt) > ξ ∀Πt (37)
f (Zt) ≤ 1 ∀Zt (38)
Then there is a unique globally determinate equilibrium.
Proof: The proof will proceed in several steps. As a first step we shall
show that the equilibrium is unique. From (18) and (24) the equations of the
curves Xt+1 = Xt and Πt+1 = Πt are respectively:
Xt = F
·
Xt
ζ (1 + n)Πt
¸
(39)
Φ (Πt)
ξ
−Πt = νF
·
Xt
ζ (1 + n)Πt
¸
(40)
Let us diﬀerentiate logarithmically the two equations. We obtain for the
locus Xt+1 = Xt (equation 39):
dXt
Xt
= f
µ
dXt
Xt
− dΠtΠt
¶
(41)
Assumption (38) implies that the curve Xt+1 = Xt is downward sloping.
Let us now diﬀerentiate the equation of the locus Πt+1 = Πt (equation
40). We find:
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Πt [Φ0 (Πt)− ξ]
Φ (Πt)− ξΠt
dΠt
Πt
= f
µ
dXt
Xt
− dΠtΠt
¶
(42)
We may note that:
Φ (Πt)− ξΠt =
ΠtZ
0
[Φ0 (Πs)− ξ] dΠs (43)
so that assumption (37) implies that:
Φ (Πt)− ξΠt > 0 (44)
So using (42) and (44) we see that assumptions (37) and (38) imply that
the curve Πt+1 = Πt is upward sloping.
Since the curve Xt+1 = Xt is downward sloping and the curve Πt+1 = Πt
is upward sloping, their intersection, if it exists, is unique.
We can now move to the study of global determinacy of this equilibrium.
The dynamics of the system is given by:
Xt+1 > Xt if Xt < F
·
Xt
ζ (1 + n)Πt
¸
(45)
Πt+1 > Πt if νF
·
Xt
ζ (1 + n)Πt
¸
<
Φ (Πt)
ξ
−Πt (46)
This is represented in figure 1 where it appears that the unique equilib-
rium has saddle path dynamics and global determinacy. Q.E.D.
Figure 1
There remains now to check that there exist functions Φ (Πt) such that
condition (37), which replaces the Taylor principle, is satisfied.
5.1 Linear interest rate rules
We shall now show that there are interest rate rules that satisfy condition
(37). Let us consider indeed here simple linear interest rate rules:
Φ (Πt) = AΠt +B A > 0 B > 1 (47)
Condition (37) will be satisfied if:
A > ξ (48)
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We can further compute the elasticity of these policy rules:
φ (Πt) =
∂LogΦ (Πt)
∂LogΠt
=
∂Log (AΠt +B)
∂LogΠt
=
AΠt
AΠt +B
< 1 (49)
We note that this elasticity is always below 1. So, whatever the inflation
rate, these interest rate rules do not satisfy the Taylor principle.
5.2 Fiscal policy
To make the example complete, we have to add to this monetary rule an
explicit fiscal policy. We can take the following particularly simple policy:
F (Zt) = γZt (50)
which corresponds to the following evolution of government liabilities:
Ωt+1 = γΩt (51)
For this policy f = 1, so condition (38) is satisfied. So the set of policies
characterized by (47), (48) and (50) does satisfy the conditions of proposition
1, and therefore leads to global determinacy
6 Conclusions
A recent lively subject of research has been the search for conditions on
monetary and fiscal policies that ensure global determinacy of the economic
system. Two classic conditions, the Taylor principle and the fiscal theory
of the price level (FTPL) turned out to be somewhat unsatisfactory: The
Taylor principle delivers only local, but not global determinacy. The FTPL
is implicitly based on fiscal policies that can make government’s liabilities
explosive in oﬀ-equilibrium paths, and this could be dangerous in real life
situations.
So our purpose was to find a new interest rate rule that ensures global
determinacy even when associated with “reasonable” fiscal policies (in the
sense of condition 36). Proposition 1 shows that such a combination is ac-
tually feasible, and that condition (37) is an operational alternative to the
Taylor principle.
A key to our results is the use of a “non Ricardian” framework where new
agents enter the economy every period and Ricardian equivalence does not
hold. This assumption seems more realistic than the traditional “Ricardian”
framework with no birth. It has already proved quite useful in studying
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local determinacy (Bénassy, 2005), and appears here to be central for global
determinacy as well.
It may finally be noted that the conditions given in proposition 1 can be
extended to diﬀerent frameworks. For example in appendix 2 the assumption
of rational expectations is replaced by a very simple learning process, and it
is shown that the very same policies assumed in proposition 1 lead to stable
dynamics around the same unique equilibrium.
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Appendix 1
In this appendix we shall derive the fundamental dynamic equation (15).
Consider the household’s budget equation (4), and assume that it is strictly
positive. The household will thus satisfy the “cash in advance” equation
exactly, so that mjt = Ptcjt and the budget constraint is written:
ωjt+1 = (1 + it)ωjt + Ptyt − Ptτ t − (1 + it)Ptcjt (52)
Let us define the following discount factors:
Rt =
1
(1 + i0) . . . (1 + it−1)
R0 = 1 (53)
Maximizing the utility function (1) subject to the sequence of budget
constraints (52) from time t to infinity yields household j’s consumption
function:
RtPtcjt = (1− β)
"
Rtωjt +
∞X
s=t
Rs+1Ps (ys − τ s)
#
(54)
Summing this across the Nt agents alive in period t, and using the equi-
librium condition Ct = Yt we obtain the equilibrium equation:
RtPtYt = RtPtCt = (1− β)
"
RtΩt +Nt
∞X
s=t
Rs+1Ps (ys − τ s)
#
(55)
Let us divide both sides by Nt, subtract from it the corresponding equa-
tion for t+ 1, and then divide by Rt+1. We obtain:
(1 + it)Ptyt − Pt+1yt+1 = (1− β)
·
(1 + it)Ωt
Nt
− Ωt+1
Nt+1
+ Pt (yt − τ t)
¸
(56)
Divide the government’s budget equation (9) by Nt and insert it into
equation (56). This yields:
Pt+1yt+1 = β (1 + it)Ptyt − (1− β)
µ
1
Nt
− 1
Nt+1
¶
Ωt+1 (57)
Now multiply (57) by Nt+1, and assume Nt+1/Nt = 1 + n. We obtain
equation (15).
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Appendix 2
Learning
We shall now show that the suﬃcient conditions of proposition 1 are
not limited to the rational expectations framework, but apply as well in a
very simple learning process. Let us recall the two dynamic equations in the
non-Ricardian system under rational expectations (equations 18 and 24):
Πt+1 =
Φ (Πt)
ξ
− νXt+1 (58)
Xt+1 = F
·
Xt
ζ (1 + n)Πt
¸
(59)
Now in a framework with learning Πt+1 in the first equation has to be
replaced by an inflationary expectation, denoted Πet+1. We shall assume a
particularly simple “learning scheme” by making the simple “static expecta-
tions” assumption:
Πet+1 = Πt−1 (60)
so that the first equation becomes:
Φ (Πt)
ξ
= Πt−1 + νXt+1 (61)
The dynamic system now consists of the two equations (59) and (61).
We want to show that the very same conditions that led to determinacy
under rational expectations (proposition 1) will lead to a stable system under
learning. This is done through the following proposition:
Proposition 2: Let us assume:
Φ0 (Πt) > ξ ∀Πt (62)
f (Zt) ≤ 1 ∀Zt (63)
Then there is a unique dynamically stable equilibrium.
Proof: We shall first show that the equilibrium is unique. As in proposition
1 the equation of the curve Xt+1 = Xt is:
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Xt = F
·
Xt
ζ (1 + n)Πt
¸
(64)
and from (63) it is downward sloping. Now from (61) the equation of the
locus Πt = Πt−1 is:
Φ (Πt−1)
ξ
−Πt−1 = νXt+1 = νF
·
Xt
ζ (1 + n)Πt
¸
νF
·
Xt
ζ (1 + n)Πt−1
¸
= νF
·
F [Xt−1/ζ (1 + n)Πt−1]
ζ (1 + n)Πt−1
¸
(65)
or, forwarding one period, the equation of the locus Πt+1 = Πt is:
Φ (Πt)
ξ
−Πt = νF
·
F [Xt/ζ (1 + n)Πt]
ζ (1 + n)Πt
¸
(66)
which, combining (62) and (63) as in proposition 1, is upward sloping. Since
the locus Xt+1 = Xt is downward sloping, and the locus Πt+1 = Πt upward
sloping, the intersection of the two loci, when it exists, is unique.
We shall now determine the eigenvalues of the dynamic system. Let us
call as before:
χ = χ (Πt) =
Φ0 (Πt)
ξ
µ = µ (Πt) =
Φ (Πt)
ξΠt
(67)
and linearize the two equations (59) and (61) around the steady state (Π, X):
Xt+1 −X = f (Xt −X)−
fX
Π (Πt −Π) (68)
χ (Πt −Π) = Πt−1 −Π+ ν (Xt+1 −X) (69)
From (61) we know that in steady state:
νX
Π =
Φ (Π)
ξΠ − 1 = µ− 1 (70)
So rearranging and combining (68) and (69) we obtain:
Xt −X = f (Xt−1 −X)−
f (µ− 1)
ν
(Πt−1 −Π) (71)
[χ+ f (µ− 1)] (Πt −Π) = Πt−1 −Π+ νf (Xt −X)
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= νf2 (Xt−1 −X) +
£
1− f2 (µ− 1)
¤
(Πt−1 −Π) (72)
or in matrix form: ·
Πt −Π
Xt −X
¸
=M
·
Πt−1 −Π
Xt−1 −X
¸
(73)
M =
·
[1− f2 (µ− 1)] / [χ+ f (µ− 1)] f2ν/ [χ+ f (µ− 1)]
−f (µ− 1) /ν f
¸
(74)
The characteristic polynomial is:
Ψ (λ) = λ2 − 1 + fχ
χ+ f (µ− 1)λ+
f
χ+ f (µ− 1) (75)
We can compute:
Ψ (0) = f
χ+ f (µ− 1) > 0 (76)
Ψ (1) = (1− f) (χ− 1) + f (µ− 1)
χ+ f (µ− 1) > 0 (77)
So both roots are on the same side of 1. The decisive number is the
product of the roots which is f/ [χ+ f (µ− 1)]. The system will be locally
stable if this product is smaller than one, i.e. if:
f < χ+ f (µ− 1) (78)
If χ (Πt) > 1, then µ (Πt) > 1, and condition (78) is satisfied for all
fiscal rules such that f (Zt) < 1. Note that the roots can be real or complex
depending on the values of the parameters. Q.E.D.
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